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Abstract— A hybrid ad hoc network is a structure-based net-
work that is extended using multi-hop communications. Indeed,
in this kind of network, the existence of a communication
link between the mobile station and the base station is not
required: A mobile station that has no direct connection with
a base station can use other mobile stations as relays. Com-
pared with conventional (single-hop) structure-based networks,
this new generation can lead to a better use of the available
spectrum and to a reduction of infrastructure costs. However,
these benefits would vanish if the mobile nodes did not properly
cooperate and forward packets for other nodes. In this paper,
we propose a charging and rewarding scheme to encourage the
most fundamental operation, namely packet forwarding. We use
“MAC layering” to reduce the space overhead in the packets
and a stream cipher encryption mechanism to provide “implicit
authentication” of the nodes involved in the communication.
We analyze the robustness of our protocols against rational
and malicious attacks. We show that - using our solution -
collaboration is rational for selfish nodes. We also show that our
protocols thwart rational attacks and detect malicious attacks.
Keywords: C.2.0.f Network-level security and protection; C.2.1.k
Wireless communication; K.6.5.a Authentication; K.6.m.b Security;
K.4.4.e Payment schemes.
1 INTRODUCTION
The geographic area covered by a conventional structure-
based network (e.g., cellular network, WiFi network, . . . ) is
populated with base stations (also called access points) that are
connected to each other via a backbone. A mobile node can
use the network when it has a direct (single-hop) connection to
a base station, but as soon as it is beyond the reach of the base
stations’ coverage, the mobile node is disconnected from the
structure-based network. For the operator, the usual solution
to this problem consists in increasing the coverage by adding
antennas; and for the user to move until he reaches a covered
region. An alternative solution1 would be to allow multi-hop
communications in the structure-based network, which would
make it possible for the isolated node to ask other nodes to
relay its traffic to or from a base station.
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1Note that we do not assume that multi-hop communication is always the
best solution to increase infrastructure coverage. The decision whether or not
a given network should be extended using multi-hopping is out of the scope
of this paper.
The resulting hybrid ad hoc network [1, 27, 11, 3, 25],
also called multi-hop cellular network, offers several benefits
[18, 19]. First of all, the coverage of the network is increased
while the number of fixed antennas is kept relatively small.
Reducing the number of antennas is beneficial for the operator
because it represents a cost reduction and also because of the
“NIMBY” (Not in my back yard) [24] attitude that makes site
acquisition and approval both tedious and difficult. Second,
the energy consumption of the nodes can be reduced because
the signal has to cover a smaller distance. And finally, as the
radiated energy is reduced, the interference with other nodes
diminishes as well.
Given the advantages listed above, hybrid ad hoc networks
represent a new and promising paradigm. However, the proper
operation of this new family of networks requires the mobile
nodes to collaborate with each other. This collaboration cannot
be taken for granted in a civilian network because each
user wants to maximize his benefit while minimizing his
contribution. Indeed, forwarding packets is energy-consuming
and a selfish user can tamper with his mobile device to remove
the relaying functions or simply shut down the device when he
is not using it. A systematic denial of the packet forwarding
service would remove all the benefits introduced by the multi-
hop aspect of the communications.
In this paper, we propose a set of protocols to foster
cooperation for the packet forwarding service in hybrid ad hoc
networks. This solution is based on a charging and rewarding
system.
This paper extends and completes our previous treatment
of the same problem [4]. This work is part of the MICS
Terminodes Project [14]. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. We introduce the system, including the adversarial
model, in Section 2 and describe our proposed protocols
in Section 3. In Section 4, we analyse the robustness of
our solution against rational and malicious attacks and we
show that the charging and rewarding scheme encourages
cooperation in hybrid ad hoc networks. In Section 5, we
present an estimate of the communication and computation
overhead of our protocols. Finally, we describe the related
work in Section 6 and we present our conclusions and future
work in Section 7.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
2.1 Assumptions
The system consists of a set of base stations connected to
a high speed backbone and a set of mobile nodes. The mobile
nodes use the base stations and, if necessary, the backbone to
communicate with each other or with a host connected to the
backbone. Communication between the mobile nodes and the
base stations is based on wireless technology and the nodes are
2loosely synchronized with their base station. We assume that
all communication is packet-based and that all the base stations
and the backbone are operated by a single operator that is
fully trusted by all mobile nodes, be it for charging, for route
setup, or for packet forwarding. For the sake of simplicity, we
consider that the nodes and the base stations have the same
power range, which, we assume, will lead to bidirectional links
(i.e., even if the quality of the link is not necessarily the same
in both directions, we assume that the communication is still
possible in both directions).
We call a cell [18] the geographical area that is controlled
by a given base station. The power range of the base station is
smaller than the radius of the cell, meaning that some nodes
have to rely on multi-hop relaying to communicate with the
base station. We consider a model in which the nodes move.
However, we assume that the routes are stable enough to allow
for the sending of a substantial number of packets and thus to
amortize the cost of running a routing protocol (see Section 5).
We assume each node i to be registered with the operator and
to share a long-term symmetric key Ki with it. Ki is the only
long-term cryptographic material stored in i. The secret keys
of all the nodes in the network are maintained at the operator.
2.2 Rationale of the solution
When a mobile node A (the initiator) wants to communicate
with another mobile2 node B (the correspondent), it first
establishes an end-to-end session with B. As we will see
in detail, in Subsection 3.2, a session is a route on which
all nodes are authenticated. This is done by establishing an
initiator session between A and the base station of the initiator
BSA and a correspondent session between the base station of
the correspondent BSB and B. These sessions are used to
exchange packets between A and B, in both directions.
For each packet, we call S its source (which is A or B)
and D its destination (therefore B or A, respectively). The
base stations of S and D are denoted by BSS and BSD ,
respectively. The packet is then sent by the source S to BSS ,
if necessary in multiple hops. If D resides in a different cell,
then the packet is forwarded by BSS to BSD via the backbone.
Finally, the packet is sent to D, possibly in multiple hops
again. If one of the routes is broken, then a new session is
established using an alternative route. Note that the system
model described above is similar to that of [18], with the
difference that we require all communication to pass through
a base station. Although this may lead to sub-optimal routes,
our model has the advantage of significantly reducing the
complexity of routing from the nodes’ point of view, since
they have to maintain only a single route (to the base station)
instead of one route per correspondent. Of course, the base
station has to maintain a route to every node in its cell.
To encourage the intermediate nodes to forward the traffic,
we propose to charge the initiator A for the traffic in both
directions and to reward the forwarding nodes (the operator
is rewarded as well). We take advantage of the presence of
the trusted operator and assume that it maintains a billing
2We consider mobile-to-mobile communication as it is the most complete
case.
account for every node in the system; our remuneration scheme
(see Subsection 3.4.1) is implemented by manipulating the
appropriate billing accounts.
Our protocols are based entirely on symmetric key cryp-
tography. Although asymmetric cryptographic primitives may
seem to be more suitable for implementing some of the func-
tions of our scheme, they have a high computational overhead
(compared to symmetric key primitives), which prevents their
application in resource constrained mobile devices.
2.3 Adversarial model
Attacker model: An attacker M is rational if it misbehaves
only when this is beneficial in terms of remuneration, service
provision or saving resources. Otherwise, M is malicious.
The users are selfish and thus each node in the network is
potentially an attacker. We assume that several attackers can
collude to perform more sophisticated attacks. We also assume
that an attacker is occasionally able to compromise “good”
nodes by retrieving their secret keys.
Attack Model: We do not attempt to ensure secrecy or
anonymity of communication and thus, we do not study
passive attacks (where the attacker analyzes the data without
altering it). Instead, we are interested in active attacks, where
the attacker modifies, deletes or injects data in the network. We
consider exclusively the attacks performed against our solution
(e.g., we do not consider DoS attacks based on jamming) and
we identify the following active attacks:
• Packet dropping: M drops a packet it is asked to forward.
• Replay: M replays a valid packet from an expired or still
existing session.
• Filtering: M modifies a packet it is asked to forward.
• Emulation: M uses the secret key of a node it compro-
mised to perform actions in its name.
2.4 Interaction with the underlying routing pro-
tocol
Our solution assumes the existence of an underlying (proac-
tive or reactive) ad hoc routing protocol that provides the
initiator A and the base station BSB with the initiator route
(route between A and BSA) and the correspondent route
(route between BSB and B), respectively. The main incentive
for the nodes on these routes to cooperate in the routing
is the expected future benefit (i.e., the remuneration). Our
solution does not require the underlying routing protocol to
be secure. Indeed, the operator is able, in our solution, to
detect several routing attacks such as those described in [13]
(see Subsection 4.6 for more details).
3 PROPOSED SOLUTION
3.1 Building blocks and notation
Our protocols use two cryptographic building blocks: A
MAC (Message Authentication Code) function and a stream
cipher [21]. However, our use of these primitives is unconven-
tional:
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we need all the nodes in the path to authenticate the
request message and, instead of appending one MAC
computed by each of the nodes to the message, we use an
iterative “MAC layering” technique. The principle of this
technique is explained in Subsection 3.2. Our solution
achieves a similar effect to that of the classical MAC
appending technique but keeps the size of the request
constant. Therefore, our technique is more efficient in
terms of bandwidth usage. To the best of our knowledge,
such a scheme has not been proposed yet for ad hoc
networks.
• During the packet sending phase (see Subsection 3.3), we
apply an iterative stream cipher encryption mechanism
that can be considered as an “implicit” authentication
mechanism because it allows the operator to verify that
the packet took the route it was supposed to take. At
the same time, it thwarts the free-riding attack (see
Subsection 4.3).
Notation: We denote the concatenation operator by | and
the XOR operator by ⊕.
3.2 Session setup
As explained in Section 2, when an initiator A wants to
communicate with a correspondent B, it first has to set up
an end-to-end session. The goal of the session setup is (i) to
test the initiator route (route between A and BSA, containing
a relays) and the correspondent route (route between BSB
and B, containing b relays), obtained from the underlying
routing protocol; (ii) to authenticate all nodes belonging to
these routes; and (iii) to inform these nodes about the traffic
that will follow. A node can decide to not join the session,
in which case the session setup fails and a new session is
established using an alternative route. Successful completion
of the session setup phase is a confirmation that both the
initiator and correspondent routes are operational and that the
end-to-end intermediate nodes accept to forward the traffic.
Fig. 1. The session setup phase
In order to set up a session, A generates an initiator session
setup request message AReq0 that contains a fresh request
identifier AReqID (e.g., generated in sequence), the initiator
route ARoute, and some information TrafficInfo about the
traffic to be sent3. In addition, the request has a field oldASID
3The initiator A may not have any precise information about the traffic B
will generate. TrafficInfo is thus an estimate for the expected traffic in both
directions. If A underestimates the traffic, the relaying nodes might interrupt
the packet forwarding because the amount of data to forward is much larger
than expected.
to carry the session ID of the broken initiator session, in case
the request is sent to re-establish a broken session. This field is
set to zero in the case of a new session establishment. Finally,
AReq0 contains a MAC computed by A using its secret key
KA:
AReq0 = [ AReqID | oldASID | ARoute | TrafficInfo |
MACKA(AReqID | oldASID | ARoute |
TrafficInfo) ]
Each forwarding node i (1 ≤ i ≤ a) on the initiator
route checks the traffic information TrafficInfo. If i decides
to participate in the forwarding, then it computes a MAC on
the whole message using its own key Ki, replaces the MAC
in the request with the newly computed MAC, and forwards
the request AReq i to the next hop (or to BSA) where:
AReq i = [ AReqID | oldASID | ARoute | TrafficInfo |
MACKi(AReq i−1) ]
Thus, when the request arrives to BSA, it contains a single
“layered” MAC that was computed by A and all the nodes on
the initiator route in an iterative manner. BSA then repeats all
the MAC computations and checks the result against the MAC
in the received request. It also verifies that the request ID is
fresh (i.e., the message is not a duplicate) and if the request
is sent to re-establish a broken initiator session, it verifies that
oldASID corresponds to a valid session identifier previously
initiated by A. If one of these verifications is not successful,
then BSA drops the request, otherwise it sends the request, via
the backbone, to the base station BSB . BSB generates and
sends a correspondent session setup request BReq0 towards
B:
BReq0 = [ BReqID | oldBSID | BRoute | TrafficInfo ]
where BReqID is a fresh request identifier generated by the
base station BSB , oldBSID is the session ID of the broken
correspondent session, in case the request is sent to re-establish
a broken session and BRoute is the correspondent route.
Each forwarding node j (1 ≤ j ≤ b) on the correspondent
route computes and sends BReqj in the same way as the
forwarding nodes in the initiator route did:
BReqj = [ BReqID | oldBSID | BRoute | TrafficInfo |
MACKj (BReqj−1) ]
When B receives the request BReqb, it returns to BSB a
correspondent session setup reply BRep that contains the cor-
respondent request ID BReqID and a MAC that is computed
over the received request BReqb (including the MAC therein)
using the key KB of B:
BRep = [ BReqID | MACKB (BReqb) ]
The reply is relayed back without any modifications to BSB
on the reverse route of the request. BSB checks the “layered”
MAC and if it verifies correctly, BSB informs BSA that the
session is valid. Then BSA (respectively, BSB ) sends an initia-
tor (respectively, a correspondent) session setup confirmation
message towards A (respectively B). The initiator session
4setup confirmation message AConf contains the initiator re-
quest ID AReqID and two freshly generated random numbers
AUSID and ADSID representing the initiator session IDs to
be used for packets sent from A to BSA and from BSA to
A, respectively. It also contains a series of MACs where each
MAC is intended for one of the nodes on the initiator route
(including A):
AConf = [ AReqID | AUSID | ADSID | AMACA |
AMAC 1 | . . . | AMAC a ]
AMAC i = MACKi(AReqID | AUSID | ADSID |
oldASID | ARoute | TrafficInfo)
The correspondent session setup confirmation BConf has a
similar structure:
BConf = [ BReqID | BUSID | BDSID | BMAC 1 |
. . . | BMAC b | BMACB ]
BMAC j = MACKj (BReqID | BUSID | BDSID |
oldBSID | BRoute | TrafficInfo)
Each node on the initiator and correspondent routes (includ-
ing A and B) verifies its own AMAC or BMAC and stores the
two initiator or correspondent session IDs, respectively. The
state information related to the established sessions (including
session IDs, routes and cryptographic parameters) is stored
in the operator’s database. Then, using its secret key Ki and
the session identifier, each node i involved in the commu-
nication generates a session key K ′i (e.g., K ′i = hKi(SID),
SID = AUSID and ADSID if i is in the initiator route, and
SID = BUSID and BDSID if i is in the corresponding route,
which leads to two session keys for each node, one for each
direction of the communication) that it will use during the
packet sending and the payment redemption phases. The base
stations BSA and BSB also compute the session keys of all the
nodes involved in the communication and save them locally.
The session becomes active for the base stations when they
send the confirmation messages and for the nodes when they
receive a valid confirmation message. Node i starts a timer ti
when it receives the request message; ti is restarted each time i
receives a valid message or packet that belongs to the session.
Node i closes the session if ti expires; closing a session means
that the node discards all subsequent messages or packets that
belong to the session. The nodes and the base stations keep
state information in the memory until the acknowledgement
and (if needed) packet receipts are sent to the operator (see
Subsection 3.4).
Note that in the case of initiator (respectively, correspon-
dent) session re-establishment, it is not necessary to also re-
establish the correspondent (respectively, the initiator) session
if the latter is still valid. The broken session is re-established
using an alternative route and it is linked to the other (still
valid) session in the operator’s database.
3.3 Packet sending
Once the session has been set up, S (which is A or B) starts
sending packets to D.
Fig. 2. The packet sending phase
The `-th packet SPkt0,` sent by S contains the session ID
SSID (which is called AUSID if S = A and BUSID if
S = B), the sequence number `, and the payload Payload `.
It also contains the “receipt seed” SRcpt0,` (details about
the computation and the use of the receipts are given in
Subsections 3.4.1 and 3.4.4). In addition, S computes a MAC
on the packet using the session key K ′S and encrypts the body
of the packet (including the MAC) by XORing it with the pad
PADS,`:
SPkt0,` = [ SSID | SRcpt0,` | ` | Body0,` ]
where SRcpt0,` = MACK′S (SSID | `)
and Body0,` = PADS,` ⊕ [ Payload ` |
MACK′
S
(SSID | ` | Payload `) ]
The pads PAD i,` are generated by node i (i = S for the
source) as follows (see Figure 3): The session ID SSID (DSID
for the down-stream nodes) and K ′i are used as a seed to
initialize the key stream generator of the stream cipher. Then,
PAD i,` is chosen as the `-th block of length MaxLength
of the generated key stream, where MaxLength denotes the
maximum allowed length of packets in bytes. If the length L`
of the packet to be encrypted is smaller than MaxLength , then
only the last L` bytes of PAD i,` are used, the rest of PAD i,`
is thrown away.
Fig. 3. Encryption of the packets
The node i in the up-stream route (route between S and
BSS ) verifies that the packet is not a duplicate, updates (and
stores) the receipt4 SRcpt i,` (details are in Subsection 3.4.4)
and encrypts the body of the packet using the pad PAD i,`:
SPkt i,` = [ SSID | SRcpt i,` | ` | Body i,` ]
where SRcpt i,` = MACK′i(SSID | SRcpt i−1,`)
and Body i,` = PAD i,` ⊕ Body i−1,`
4The receipt SRcpti,` can be used by node i as a proof that it correctly
received the packet SPkti,` (see Subsection 3.4.1 for more details).
5When BSS receives the packet, it retrieves the session keys
of the nodes on the up-stream route, recomputes the pads and
removes all encryptions from the packet. If the resulting packet
verifies correctly (i.e., it is not a duplicate and it has a valid
MAC), the packet is forwarded5 to the base station of the
destination BSD , otherwise it is dropped. BSD changes the up-
stream session ID to the corresponding down-stream session
ID DSID (which is BDSID if S = A and ADSID if S = B),
computes a new MAC for D, computes the pad PADj,` for
each node j on the down-stream route (route between BSD
and D), including D, and encrypts the packet (including the
MAC) by iteratively XORing it with all these pads. The result
is:
DPkt0,` = [ DSID | ` | Body0,` ] where
Body0,` = PAD1,` ⊕ . . .⊕ PADd,` ⊕ PADD,` ⊕
[ Payload ` | MACK′D (DSID | ` | Payload `) ]
BSD stores MACK′
D
(DSID | ` | Payload `) of every
packet it sends together with the sequence number ` in order
to be able to verify future destination acknowledgements and
packet receipts. Note that for the down stream, we do not
need to add a field dedicated to the receipt; the receipt is
generated using several fields of the down-stream packet (see
Subsection 3.4.4).
Upon reception of DPktj−1,`, each node j computes and
stores the receipt DRcptj,` for the packet (as explained in
Subsection 3.4.4), decrypts the body of DPktj−1,` by XORing
it with the pad PADj,`, and forwards the result DPktj,` to the
next hop where:
DPktj,` = [ DSID | ` | Bodyj,` ]
and Bodyj,` = PADj,` ⊕ Bodyj−1,`
When the packet reaches D, it removes the remaining en-
cryption pad by XORing the packet with PADD,`. D can then
verify the validity of the MAC generated by BSD and store
the MAC and ` for the generation of the acknowledgement
(see Subsection 3.4.2). Note that for up-stream and down-
stream packets, removing the encryptions and verifying the
correctness of the resulting packet implicitly identifies the
forwarding nodes and ensures that the packet took the right
route.
3.4 Payment Redemption
3.4.1 Charging
As we have already mentioned in Subsection 2.2, charging
and remuneration are performed by the network operator, by
manipulating the accounts of the nodes. When BSS receives
the packet Pkt` of length L` sent by the source S, the up-
stream forwarding nodes are credited α(L`) and the initiator
A is charged n(L`). Both α(L`) and n(L`) depend on the
packet size and not on the number of forwarding nodes in the
path. The operator will then take a loss for long routes but
will make a profit from short routes. The charges and rewards
5The packet is forwarded only if it is a data packet. The treatment of up-
stream acknowledgement packets is presented in Subsection 3.4.2.
should thus be set so that – relative to the average path length
– the operator makes the desired profit.
The down-stream forwarding nodes are credited when Pkt`
is acknowledged by D (see Subsection 3.4.2) because the
operator may have no other reliable information about the
delivery of the packet. The only incentive for D to not send the
acknowledgement is to save resources. In order to discourage
this misbehavior, D is charged a small amount ε when BSD
injects Pkt` in the down-stream route and is reimbursed
when Pkt` is acknowledged. Note that, as the operator cannot
distinguish between a packet loss and the case where D does
not want to send the acknowledgment, it keeps the charge ε
if no acknowledgement arrives for Pkt`.
If the packet is dropped or lost in the up-stream route, the
nodes that relayed it can present the receipt for this packet
(see Subsection 3.4.4) to the operator. The operator identifies
the last node k (1 ≤ k ≤ u) in the path who sent a
valid receipt for the packet and gives it a reward β(Lmin),
whereas the nodes that are before k in the path receive a
reward α(Lmin), where Lmin denotes the minimum length
of a packet. This choice of reward is made because if the
reward is higher than α(Lmin), the forwarding nodes may be
tempted to drop short packets in order to get higher rewards
than the ones they would get if they forward them. A is
charged n′(Lmin) = (k− 1) ·α(Lmin)+β(Lmin). Receiving
β(Lmin) can be perceived by k as its reward for informing
the operator that the nodes 1 to k − 1 in the path behaved
properly. The β-reward should be sufficiently large to strongly
counterbalance the cost c of forwarding the packet and the
cost c′ of maintaining and sending the receipt (β  c and
β  c′). The α-reward should also be substantially larger
than β (α β) to prevent nodes from systematically dropping
packets. Note that even if c and c′ are not constants (e.g., they
depend on the battery level of the node), we can choose the α
and β-reward in such a way that the conditions listed above
are fulfilled.
If the packet is dropped or lost in the down-stream route,
the nodes that relayed it are rewarded in a similar way as
for the up-stream forwarding nodes, except for α(Lmin) and
β(Lmin) that are replaced by α(L`) and β(L`), respectively,
because the operator received the packet and knows its real
length L`. The initiator A is fully charged n(L`).
3.4.2 Destination acknowledgement
The destination D must acknowledge every packet it cor-
rectly receives. However, in order to save resources, it does
not send acknowledgements on a per packet basis. Instead,
the session is subdivided into “time periods” and the packets
received during each period are acknowledged in a single
batch. The acknowledgment DAck t of the t-th time period
of the session is formatted as the payload of a regular packet6
and sent by D via the down-stream route to BSD:
DAck t = [ Batcht | DFPkt t | DLPkt t | DLost t |
MACK′
D
(Batcht | DFPkt t | DLPkt t | DLost t) ]
6It is necessary to be able to differentiate between a data packet and an
acknowledgement (e.g., by using a flag bit).
6where DFPkt t and DLPkt t are the sequence numbers of,
respectively, the first and the last received packets during the
t-th time period, DLost t is the list of the missing packets
between DFPkt t and DLPkt t and
Batch =
⊕
DFPkt t ≤ `;
` ≤ DLPkt t;
` 6∈ DLost t
MACK′
D
(DSID | ` | Payload `)
where MACK′
D
(DSID | ` | Payload `) is the MAC re-
ceived in the packet Pkt`.
The packet is forwarded as a regular packet of the session.
When BSD receives it, the packet is decrypted and identified
as being an acknowledgement. Then, BSD verifies the MAC
and checks Batcht by XORing all the MACs of the packets
from DFPkt t to DLPkt t, excluding those in DLost t and
comparing the result with the received value. If the verification
fails, then BSD ignores the acknowledgement. If BSD does
not receive DAck t during the t + 1-th time period or if the
throughput is not satisfactory (i.e., too many lost packets), an
alternative route is used to establish a new session.
3.4.3 Up-stream acknowledgment
To attenuate the effect of several malicious attacks (see Sec-
tion 4), the base station BSS sends a single acknowledgment
UAck t to S for all the packets it received during the t-th time
period of the session. UAck t is sent in a regular packet and
its format is similar to the format of DAck t, except that the
base station does not have to provide a Batch-like proof to
the source:
UAck t = [ UFPkt t | ULPkt t | ULost t |
MACK′
S
(UFPkt t | ULPkt t | ULost t) ]
When S receives UAck t, it identifies it as being an acknowl-
edgement and checks its validity by verifying its MAC. S can
choose to re-establish the session to BSS using an alternative
route if no acknowledgement arrives for a given time period
or if the throughput is unsatisfactory.
3.4.4 Packet receipts
The concept of receipt we use in this paper is similar to the
one used in [28]. It does not represent a proof that the node
forwarded the packet but rather that it received it correctly. As
we will see in Subsection 4.1, the use of the receipts helps to
make packet forwarding rational.
For an up-stream forwarding node i, the receipt SRcpt i,`
for the packet Pkt` is sent together with the payload and
it is computed as explained in Subsection 3.3. We need a
field dedicated to the receipt in the up-stream part of the
communication, because if a part of the packet is used to
compute the receipt, BSS has no way to verify it in the case
of packet loss, which is the very purpose of the receipts. For
a down-stream forwarding node j, the receipt DRcptj,` is
computed as follows: DRcptj,` = MACK′j (DSID | Mj,`)
where Mj,` represents the MAC field of the packet DPktj,`.
It is possible for the operator to verify the receipts because
it stores the MACs of the packets (they are also used to
compute/verify the destination acknowledgements).
In order to save memory space, both up- and down-stream
forwarding nodes do not store the receipts for each packet
but rather for a whole session; the forwarding node i stores a
batch for each session it is involved in as a forwarding node:
BatchSID,i =
⊕
`≤LPkt ;` 6∈Lost Rcpt i,` where LPkt is the
sequence number of the last packet received so far and Lost is
the set of the sequence numbers of missing packets preceding
LPkt .
Note that for a node in the initiator route, AUSID and
ADSID correspond to two distinct sessions. When a given
session is closed and the last destination acknowledgement
is sent, the operator informs the forwarding nodes, typically
when the node is within the power range of a base station,
about the rewards they received (e.g., using a packet similar
to the up-stream acknowledgement). If a node i forwarded a
packet Pkt` and was not paid for it, i sends the receipt to
the operator. If the receipt is valid, the node is rewarded as
explained in Subsection 3.4.1. A single receipt is sent to ask
remuneration for several packets:
RcptSID,i = [ SID | BatchSID,i | LPkt | Lost |
MACK′
i
(SID | BatchSID,i | LPkt | Lost) ]
Upon reception of this message, the operator verifies the
MAC and if the verification is positive, it remunerates the node
according to the rewarding scheme (see Subsection 3.4.1).
Note that a node can ask for remuneration (by sending the
receipt) even if it did not provide the service; this attack is
studied in Subsection 4.1.
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the robustness of our set of
protocols against the active attacks identified in Subsection 2.3.
4.1 Packet dropping
In this attack, an attacker M that is part of the end-to-end
route between S and D decides to drop a packet it is asked to
forward. In this paragraph, we consider the effect of the attack
on the different phases of our protocols and we show that this
attack is not rational. This result proves, particularly for the
packet sending phase, that our solution fosters cooperation.
Session setup phase: M can drop one or several of the
following messages:
• The request message: The sender of the request (which
is A or BSB) does not receive the confirmation or the
reply message, respectively. It then establishes a new
session to the target (BSA and B, respectively) using an
alternative route. Note that dropping the request message
is not necessarily an attack because the forwarding nodes
can decide to not participate in a given session.
• The reply message: BSB never receives the reply and
the correspondent session setup fails. It then uses another
route to establish the correspondent session.
7• The confirmation message: Some of the nodes involved
in the communication are not aware of the establishment
of the session. If the initiator A is the source of the
first packet to be sent during the session, we can have
two cases: (i) M is in the initiator route, therefore A
does not receive the confirmation message and considers
that the session setup failed; it then establishes a new
session using another route. (ii)M is in the correspondent
route, the session is then active for all the nodes, except
for those that are after M in the correspondent route
(including B); these nodes discard all the packets sent
by A during the session. B is thus unable to send the
periodic acknowledgment to BSB and the session is re-
established.
The problem is totally symmetric if B is the source of
the first packet of the session. In both cases, this attack is
not rational and can be detected rapidly by the operator.
Packet sending phase: In this paragraph, we show that
denying to forward packets is not rational; cooperation is thus
the best choice for a selfish, rational node.
Proposition 1: If a node i received a packet Pkt` to for-
ward and if, later on, Pkt` was not acknowledged by the target
(BSS for the up-stream and D for the down-stream), then it
is rational for i, once the session is closed, to send a receipt
for Pkt` to the network operator.
Proof: As explained in Subsection 3.4.4, after a given
session is closed, the operator informs the nodes involved
in that session about the rewards they received. If a node i
correctly forwarded (or simply received) Pkt` and was not
paid for it, i can send a receipt for it.
Sending a receipt Rcpt of length LRcpt (see Section 5 for
numerical values) represents a cost of c′/NumPkts per packet,
where NumPkts denotes the number of packets received by
i during the session and c′ denotes the cost of sending Rcpt .
Given the assumption of route stability (see Subsection 2.1), it
is possible to neglect c′/NumPkts in comparison with c (and
thus in comparison with α and β) because NumPkts is large.
If i decides not to send a receipt for Pkt` or if it sends an
invalid receipt, then its payoff is:
• 0 if i dropped Pkt` during the packet sending phase,
• −c if it forwarded Pkt` but none of the following nodes
sent a valid receipt for it,
• α − c if it forwarded the packet and at least one of the
following nodes in the path sent a valid receipt for the
packet.
If i sends a valid receipt for Pkt`, then its payoff is:
• β if i dropped Pkt` during the packet sending phase,
• β − c if it forwarded Pkt` but none of the following
nodes sent a valid receipt for it,
• α − c if it forwarded the packet and at least one of the
following nodes in the path sent a valid receipt for the
packet.
Given that (i) a forwarding node cannot know if the receipt
is valid or not before sending it to the operator, (ii) the cost
of sending the receipt is negligible and (iii) α  β  c, we
can state that sending the receipt is rational. 2
Proposition 2: If all the nodes involved in the communica-
tion are rational, then forwarding the packet Pkt` is rational
for node i.
Proof: As we will show in Subsection 4.3, the filtering at-
tack is malicious. As the nodes involved in the communication
are rational, they will not perform this attack on the packets
they are asked to forward and thus the receipts produced by
the intermediate nodes will be correct.
If node i decides to defect and drops a packet Pkt` it is
asked to forward, i will still send a receipt for Pkt` since,
according to Proposition 1, this is the rational behavior. The
payoff of i would then be β.
If i decides to cooperate, then:
• If Pkt` reaches its target, then the payoff of i is α− c,
• If, on the contrary, Pkt` does not reach its target, then
at least one node j (j > i) will send a receipt for it
(according to Proposition 1) and the payoff of i is also
α− c.
As we have α β  c, cooperation is rational for node i.
2
Proposition 3: If the route contains an attacker that repeat-
edly drops the packet Pkt`, then the network operator can
identify it.
Proof: As long as Pkt` is relayed by rational nodes, the
packet is computed and correctly forwarded until it reaches
the malicious node M that drops it. The rational nodes that
are before M in the path will then send valid receipts for
Pkt` (according to Proposition 1). The operator identifies the
last node k in the path that sent a valid receipt, which is M
or the rational node that is before it on the route (because
M is also able to generate a valid receipt for the packet).
The operator suspects then both k and k + 1 of misbehavior.
By crosschecking the information about different sessions and
identifying the nodes that are suspected significantly more than
average, the operator can identify the attacker and punish it
in consequence. Note that if M performed this attack only a
few times, then the detection would be slower but the attack
would be less harmful. 2
Proposition 4: Forwarding the packet Pkt` is rational for
node i even if an attacker M will drop it later on.
Proof: Node i has no information about whether the nodes
after it in the path are rational or not. If it expects all of
them to be rational, then the best choice for i is to cooperate
(according to Proposition 2). If it expects node i + 1 to be
rational, then the best choice for i is to cooperate (its payoff
would be α−c because according to Proposition 1, i+1 would
send a receipt for the packet). Finally, if it expects node i+1
to be malicious and drop the packet, then the best choice for
i is also to cooperate, because otherwise the operator would
eventually believe it is malicious (according to Proposition 3)
and would punish it. 2
Payment redemption phase: The acknowledgement is
encapsulated in a regular packet and the body is encrypted
by all the nodes in the path, including the generator of
the acknowledgement. An attacker M has thus no way to
distinguish a packet containing an acknowledgement from a
data packet, especially if some padding is used to prevent the
acknowledgement packet from having a fixed and predefined
8length. A brute force attack would be for M, in order to
specifically drop the t-th acknowledgement, to drop all the
packets sent during the t+1-th time period. The consequence
of this attack is the re-establishment of the session using
another route.
4.2 Replay attack
We consider that a replay attack performed by an attacker
M is successful if the replayed message or packet is consid-
ered as valid by all the parties involved in the communication
(including the operator). Note that M is not necessarily part
of the network. In this paragraph, we will show that this attack
is malicious and never successful.
Session setup phase: The operator maintains the informa-
tion about all the sessions established so far. The replayed
message (request, reply or confirmation) is thus detected by
the first base station that receives it. A detection at the nodes
is also possible; when a node i receives a replayed request
message, it can identify it as a duplicate (and discard it) if:
• i is not part of the route in the request,
• or i is supposed to be the initiator of the communication,
• or the session to be established is already active or it is
closed but still in memory. Indeed, even if the mobile
nodes do not keep track of all the messages and packets
they received, they do maintain a short-term history (i.e.,
on-going sessions and session that are not acknowledged
yet).
Packet sending phase: As for the session setup phase, the
duplicate is detected by the first base station that receives it.
But here, the intermediate nodes are also able to detect it
because each forwarding node maintains the list of all packets
it has received so far (for the computation of the receipt,
see Subsection 3.4.4). The sequence number of the packet
to forward corresponds then to the identifier of an already
handled packet and the duplicate is discarded.
Payment redemption phase: The operator maintains the
list of all acknowledgements and receipts it receives and can
thus detect (and discard) a replayed message. Furthermore,
as explained in Subsection 4.1, it is difficult to identify the
packets containing the acknowledgements and thus to replay
them specifically.
4.3 Filtering attack
An attacker M that performs a filtering attack modifies
one or several fields of the packet it is asked to forward.
In this subsection, we analyse the effect of this attack on
our protocols. We also consider the free-riding attack where
two colluders M1 and M2, on the end-to-end route, attempt
to piggyback data (using appending or substitution) on the
exchanged packets, with the goal of not having to pay for the
communication.
Session setup phase: M can tamper with:
• The request or the reply messages: The verification of the
“layered” MAC fails and the base station (BSA or BSB)
discards the message. A new session is then established
using an alternative route.
• The confirmation message: The first node that receives the
tampered message discards it because the verification of
the MAC fails. If M tampers with one (or more) MAC(s)
in the message, the first node whose MAC was modified
and that receives the message discards it. This attack has
the same effect as dropping the confirmation message (see
Subsection 4.1) and is detected in the same way.
The fields of the session setup messages are not encrypted. It
is then possible for two colluders M1 and M2 to piggyback
information. However, the size of fields is small enough to
make the sending of useful data very long and fastidious.
Packet sending phase: M can tamper with the different
fields of the packet Pkt`.
• Modifying SID , ` or Body i,` is detected by the target
of the packet (BSS for the up-stream and D for the
down-stream) because the “layered” MAC does not verify
correctly.
• We hereafter define the early duplicate attack, a malicious
attack where M creates a fake packet with a sequence
number ` that it expects to be used by the legitimate
source in the (near) future. This packet is considered
as valid by the intermediate nodes (because they cannot
verify it) but it is discarded at the target because the
MAC is not correct. However, when the source sends the
“real” `-th packet, the forwarding nodes consider it as a
duplicate and thus discard it. Our protocols, as presented
so far, are vulnerable to this attack. If the operator wants
to attenuate the effect of this subtle attack, it can do so
(at the cost of a small overhead) by making use of hash
chains (i.e., a chain of N hash values where wN is chosen
at random, wN−i = h(wN−i+1), 0 < i ≤ N , and h is a
one-way hash function).
Let us first describe the solution for the initiator session.
During the session setup phase, the base station BSA
sends the first hash values AUw0 and ADw0 of two
sufficiently long hash chains, in the initiator confirmation
message, to the nodes in the initiator route (including
A). BSA also sends the hash value AUwm encrypted
with the secret key of A in the confirmation. A can thus
retrieve the elements 0 to m of the hash chain and send
the hash value AUw ` (1 ≤ ` ≤ m) with the `-th packet it
generates7. BSA sends the hash value ADw ` with the `-
th packet it sends toward A. The intermediate nodes can
verify the validity of the hash values by checking that
w0 = h`(w`) (w = AUw or ADw ). The verification of
the hash value can be optimized if we use mechanisms
such as [8] for example. The packets containing invalid
hash values are discarded.
The solution is totally symmetric for the correspondent
session. Note here that given w`, one can retrieve the
hash values of all the previous packets in the session.
This means that packets out of order should be discarded.
But this constraint is logical in our case because we use
the notion of sessions. All the packets are then expected
7When A is about to run out of hash values, the base station provides it
(in the same way the up-stream acknowledgment is sent) with a hash value
AUwm+n. A can then compute n new valid hash values.
9to go through the same route and to arrive in order; the
contrary is thus suspicious.
The use of the hash values can also solve the case where
the attacker tampers only with w`; the attack is detected
at the first node that receives the modified packet because
the checking of the hash value fails.
Modifying both w` and ` is an even more subtle malicious
attack. Let us assume that a forwarding node receives the
packets Pkt`−1 and Pkt` to forward. It discards Pkt`−1
and replaces the sequence number and the hash value
in Pkt` by ` − 1 and w`−1, respectively. The sequence
number and the hash value are considered as valid by
the following forwarding nodes. Of course, the packet is
discarded at the target because the MAC is not correct.
The attack is possible if the attacker is part of the route
and thus all the nodes on the route are suspected by the
operator. The first direct effect of this attack is for the
source to cancel the session, because the throughput is too
low; the second effect is that the operator eventually, by
crosschecking the information about the suspected nodes,
identifies the attacker.
• The free-riding attack is not rational during the packet
sending phase; the data sent by M1 cannot be interpreted
by M2 because it was encrypted at least by one inter-
mediate node8. If this attack is performed anyway, it is
detected as a “regular” filtering or packet dropping attack
(depending on whether M2 forwarded the tampered
packet or not).
• Modifying only the receipt SRcpt in the up-stream pack-
ets (there is no field dedicated to receipts in the down-
stream packets) is a malicious attack. If the base station
BSS detects such an attack (the packet is correct but
the receipt is not), then it re-establishes the session (if
S = B) or asks the initiator to do it (if S = A).
Such a radical solution is needed because, as explained
in Subsection 3.4.4, the nodes maintain one batch per
session by XORing all the receipts of the packets they
handled. If one of these receipts is incorrect, then the
batch is incorrect and the receipt does not verify correctly
at the operator.
• The attacker M can tamper with the packet it is asked
to forward but without altering the fields used by the
intermediate nodes to generate the receipts. The following
nodes in the route forward the modified packet. When the
target (BSS or D) receives it, it detects the attack and
re-establishes the session.
Payment redemption phase: This attack is similar to the
packet dropping attack during the payment redemption phase.
4.4 Emulation attack
This attack is equivalent to the cloning of a SIM card in
a GSM cellular network and can be detected in the same
way; a node claiming to be in several physical locations
simultaneously (e.g., it is in two geographically distinct cells)
8Having two colluding nodes that are neighbors and that perform the free-
riding attack makes no sense because they can communicate directly with
each other.
is automatically suspected by the operator. Furthermore, sta-
tistical methods can be used to determine whether certain
nodes relay more traffic than is reasonable, given the type
of the node. Either of these events suggests that the device is
dishonest.
4.5 Hybrid attacks
So far, we have analyzed the effect of each of the four
active attacks we identify in Subsection 2.3. However, more
sophisticated attacks can combine two or more of the attacks
described so far. For example, two colluders M1 and M2
that are on the same route may want to perform, respectively,
the filtering attack and the packet dropping attack. If the
filtering attack does not modify the information needed by
the intermediate nodes to compute the receipts, the operator
will detect a “regular” packet dropping attack and will identify
M2 as being the attacker (see the proof of Proposition 3). If,
on the contrary, the nodes that are between M1 and M2 are
not able to generate valid receipts, then M1 will be identified
by the operator as an attacker that performed a filtering attack
(see the Appendix). The same reasoning can be applied to the
case where there are more than two colluders.
4.6 Securing the routing protocol
As stated in Subsection 2.4, even if the underlying routing
protocol is not secure, the operator is able to detect several
routing attacks. Indeed, during the session setup, the initiator
and correspondent routes are tested and the nodes belonging
to these routes are authenticated, which allows the operator to
detect attacks such as routing loops or invalid routes. However,
some routing attacks cannot be detected before the packet
sending phase (e.g., Gratuitous detour, Black hole or Gray
hole attacks [13]); the network operator can then employ
statistical methods to detect them. Note that securing the
routing protocol is out of the scope of this paper; we therefore
consider, to exemplify, the following attacks that we believe
are the most pertinent regarding our solution:
Gratuitous detour attack: In this attack, the adversary
makes the route appear longer by adding virtual nodes [13].
The operator determines statistically if the set of intermediate
nodes is inconsistent (e.g., an emulated node is in the route
or an attacker is performing the wormhole attack) or if the
route is much too long (a route in hybrid ad hoc networks is
not expected to be long, having a too long routes is therefore
suspicious). The operator can also suspect such an attack if two
or more nodes seem to be always neighbors, despite mobility.
More heuristics can be found in [15].
Black or gray holes attack: This attack is similar to the
packet dropping attack during the packet sending phase.
5 OVERHEAD
In this section, we estimate the communication and compu-
tation overheads of the solution we have described. Reasonable
values of the size of the different fields appearing in our
protocol are provided in Table I. NbFwdrs is the number of
forwarding nodes on the route (up-stream or down-stream), `
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is the sequence number of the packet and NbLostPkts is the
number of packets lost during the session or the time period.
Field Name Size (bytes)
ReqID 4
SID 4
oldSID 4
Route NbFwdrs*16
TrafficInfo 16
MAC 16
` 4
LostPkts NbLostPkts*2
SRcpt 1
TABLE I
SIZE OF THE FIELDS USED IN OUR PROTOCOL (FOR BOTH UP AND DOWN
STREAMS)
The request ID and the session IDs are encoded on 4 bytes
each to reduce the risk of using the same identifier for
two different requests or sessions. The field Route is the
concatenation of the 16 byte identifiers (assuming e.g. an IPv6
format) of the nodes. The TrafficInfo field is used to inform
the forwarding nodes about the traffic to be generated; using
16 bytes to encode it seems to be reasonable. Finally, we
encode ` on 2 bytes to support long sessions and SRcpt on
only 1 byte because its computation and storage should be
lightweight.
5.1 Communication overhead
Session Setup Phase: According to Table I, establishing an
end-to-end session with NbFwdrs forwarding nodes (in each
of the routes) represents an overhead of 156 + NbFwdrs ∗
64 bytes.
The session setup overhead is directly related to the lifetime
of the sessions, which, in turn, very much depends on the
stability of the routes.
Description of the simulations: We consider a network
composed of 100 nodes laid out on a 500x500 m2 single
cell and one base station situated in the center of the cell.
We fix the power range of the nodes and the base station
to 100 m. We use the random waypoint mobility model [16]
with a 0 s pause time and we discard the first 1000 seconds of
simulation time to remove the initial transient phase [7]. We
perform 3 sets of simulations where the speed is uniformly
chosen between x and 10 m/s, x = 2, 3 and 4 m/s [26],
which corresponds to an average speed AvrSpeed = 5.6, 6.7
and 7.8 respectively; we run 100 simulations for each value
of AvrSpeed. As we are interested in the lifetime of the routes
and not in communication interface, our silulation is written
in plain C++ instead of ns.
Figures of interest: In our simulations we are interested in
the two following figures:
• The average lifetime of a route (AvrLT): After the initial
transient phase of each simulation, we randomly choose
a node that has a route to the local base station (we
choose the shortest path, the effect of mobility on the
performance of more sophisticated routing protocols is
discussed in [2]) and we observe the lifetime of this route.
The simulation ends when at least one link on the route
is broken. AvrLT represents the average value of all these
lifetime values over the 100 simulations.
• The average number of forwarding nodes (NbFwdrs):
This number is computed for the node we consider for
the AvrLT.
Results: The results, given in Table II, show that the stabil-
ity of the routes decreases with higher mobility of forwarding
nodes. For AvrLT, we consider a 95% confidence interval (CI).
NbFwdrs AvrLT (s) 95% CI
AvrSpeed (m/s) 5.6 6.7 7.8 5.6 6.7 7.8 5.6 6.7 7.8
1.3 1.4 1.5 10.7 8.1 7.8 2.1 1.7 1.5
TABLE II
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE DIFFERENT VALUES OF THE SPEED
(PAUSE TIME=0 S)
In order to estimate the amount of information that a node
can send during this period of time, let us consider the case
where the nodes are running a Voice over IP application using
a G.711 Codec (Rate = 64 kbit/s) with a frame size (including
the headers) of 200 bytes [10]. If we consider that the average
speed = 7.8 m/s, the route remains stable for an average of
7.8 s; it is possible during this period to send 62.4 kbytes of
data. The overhead of an end-to-end session setup is 252 bytes
(the average number of forwarding nodes is 1.5), which
represents only 0.4% of the amount of information (payload)
that is possible to send during the session. Moreover, as
explained in Subsection 3.2, it is possible to re-establish only
the broken session (the initiator session or the correspondent
session), which reduces this overhead.
The presence of one (or more) active malicious attack-
ers in the end-to-end route can also lead to a session re-
establishment. However, the operator can statistically identify
the attacker(s) (see Section 4); the risk of being identified and
punished represents a disincentive to cheat.
Packet Sending Phase: Considering the field sizes of Table
I, we can see that the packet sending phase represents an
overhead of 23 bytes for up-stream packets and 22 bytes
for down-stream packets. If the packet size is 200 bytes
(considering again the VoIP example), the overhead represents
at most 11.5% of the packet size. This overhead is reduced if
we use larger packets.
Sending the Acknowledgment: The destination acknowl-
edgement and the up-stream acknowledgement are generated
each time period and their sizes are 36+2*NbLostPktst bytes
and 20+2*NbLostPktst bytes, respectively. The receipt
RcptSID,i is a 23+2*NbLostPkts bytes message that the node
i sends directly (i.e., without relaying) to the operator once
per session. We expect the number of packets lost to be small
in both cases (i.e., acknowledgement and receipt), otherwise
the session is re-established because the throughput is not
satisfactory.
5.2 Computation overhead
In this subsection, we consider the computation overhead
for the mobile nodes. The overhead is expressed in terms of
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battery consumption and number of computations. However,
as shown in [23], we can consider the battery consumption,
due to cryptographic computations, as negligible compared to
the energy needed for data transmission.
Session Setup Phase: This operation requires all the nodes
to perform 1 MAC computation and 1 MAC verification each.
Packet Sending Phase: For each packet, the source and
the destination have to perform one MAC operation each.
However, the main overhead in this phase is represented by the
usage of stream cipher encryption (performed by the source
and all the forwarders), which ensures the authentication
of the nodes involved in the communication and prevents
the free-riding attack. But stream ciphers are very fast, and
some operate at a speed comparable to that of 32 bit CRC
computation [12].
Acknowledgment computation: For the destination ac-
knowledgement, D performs one MAC computation/time pe-
riod and one XOR operation/packet. For the up-stream ac-
knowledgement, S performs one MAC verification/time pe-
riod. Finally, for the receipts, each forwarding node performs
one MAC computation/time period and one XOR opera-
tion/packet.
Numerical example: As an example, a Celeron 850 MHz
processor under Windows 2000 SP can perform a MAC
computation (and verification) with HMAC/MD5 algorithm
at 99.863 Mbytes/s and a stream cipher encryption (and
decryption) using Panama Cipher (little endian) algorithm at
120.301 Mbytes/s [12]. These numbers provide an order of
magnitude; if slower (or faster) processors are used, they
would of course scale correspondingly.
6 RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss some research efforts related to the
issues of the cooperation of nodes in (pure) ad hoc networks
and in hybrid ad hoc networks.
Cooperation in ad hoc networks: Several research groups
have considered the problem of selfishness and the stimulation
of cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks. In [9], Fe´legyha´zi
et al. establish the connection between the ad hoc network
topology and the possible existence of cooperation. In [20],
Marti et al. consider the case where a node agrees to cooperate
but fails to do so. Their solution uses a “watchdog” mech-
anism to identify the misbehaving nodes and a “pathrater”
mechanism to construct routes that avoid those nodes. Both
the CONFIDANT [5] and the CORE [22] approaches propose
a reputation based solution to identify and punish misbehaving
nodes. In [28], Zhong et al. rely on a central authority that col-
lects receipts from the forwarding nodes and charges/rewards
the nodes based on these receipts. In [6], Buttya´n and Hubaux
use a virtual currency (nuglets) to charge/reward the packet
forwarding service provision in ad hoc networks.
Cooperation in hybrid ad hoc networks: In [17], Lam-
parter et al. propose a rewarding scheme to encourage coop-
eration in hybrid networks (i.e., mobile ad hoc networks with
access to the Internet, which they call “stub ad hoc networks”).
They assume the existence of an Internet Service Provider that
authenticates the nodes involved in a given communication
and takes care of charging or rewarding them. However, [17]
and our current approach present two main differences. First
of all, in [17], the authors analyse the robustness of their
solution only against rational attacks, whereas in our proposal
we consider malicious attacks as well. The second difference
is that the cryptographic functions used in [17] are based on
public-key cryptography, whereas our solution is based solely
on symmetric key cryptography, which is more suitable for
resource constrained mobile devices.
In [15], we have proposed a micro-payment scheme for
hybrid ad hoc networks that encourages collaboration in packet
forwarding. However, our current proposal significantly differs
from [15] in many aspects. First of all, in [15], we assume
an asymmetric communication model, where the up-stream
communication is potentially multi-hop and the down-stream
communication is always single-hop, whereas in this paper,
both the up-stream and the down-stream communications are
potentially multi-hop. Second, in [15], the nodes report a
fraction of their packet forwarding actions (on a probabilistic
basis) to an accounting center that consequently remunerates
the nodes. The approach we propose here does not rely
on reports; instead, we use the concept of session during
which each forwarding node authenticates itself to the base
station by altering the packet to be forwarded in a specific
way. Finally, the protocol proposed in [15] includes routing
decisions, whereas the protocols that we propose in this paper
are independent of routing.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a set of protocols that fosters
cooperation for the packet forwarding service in hybrid ad
hoc networks. Our solution is based on the charging and
rewarding of the nodes and relies exclusively on symmetric
cryptography to comply with the limited resources of most
mobile stations. We have used the concept of sessions, which
takes advantage of the relative stability of routes, and we have
shown that our scheme stimulates cooperation in hybrid ad
hoc networks. Finally, we have analyzed the robustness of
our protocols against various attacks and have shown that our
solution thwarts rational attacks and detects malicious attacks.
As future work, we intend to consider techniques that aim
at the calibration of the relevant parameters, and to study the
reaction of the network to sophisticated attacks (e.g., by means
of simulations). We will also explore further the statistical
detection, at the operator, of malicious attacks and we will
study the coexistence of several operators.
REFERENCES
[1] G. N. Agge´lou and R. Tafazolli. On the Relaying Capacity of Next-
Generation GSM Cellular Networks. IEEE Personal Communications,
February 2001.
[2] F. Bai, N. Sadagopan, and A. Helmy. IMPORTANT: a framework
to systematically analyze the Impact of Mobility on Performance of
RouTing protocols for Adhoc NeTworks. In Proceedings of INFOCOM,
2003.
[3] Y. Bejerano. Efficient Integration of Multi-Hop Wireless and Wired
Networks with QoS Constraints. In Proceedings of Mobicom, 2002.
12
[4] N. Ben Salem, L. Buttya´n, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson. A Charging
and Rewarding Scheme for Packet Forwarding in Multi-hop Cellular
Networks. In Proceedings of MobiHOC, 2003.
[5] S. Buchegger and J.-Y. Le Boudec. Performance Analysis of the
CONFIDANT Protocol: Cooperation Of Nodes - Fairness In Distributed
Ad Hoc NeTworks. In Proceedings of MobiHOC, 2002.
[6] L. Buttya´n and J.-P. Hubaux. Stimulating Cooperation in Self-
Organizing Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. ACM/Kluwer Mobile Networks
and Applications (MONET), 8(5), 2003.
[7] T. Camp, J. Boleng, and V. Davies. A Survey of Mobility Models
for Ad Hoc Network Research. Wireless Communication and Mobile
Computing: Special issue on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking: Research,
Trends and Applications, 2(5), 2002.
[8] D. Coppersmith and M. Jakobsson. Almost Optimal Hash Sequence
Traversal. In Proceedings of Financial Cryptography, 2002.
[9] M. Fe´legyha´zi, J.-P. Hubaux, and L. Buttya´n. Nash Equilibria of Packet
Forwarding Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. to appear in
Transactions on Mobile Computing (TMC).
[10] B. Goode. Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP). Proceedings of the
IEEE, 90, September 2002.
[11] H. Holma and A. Toskala. WCDMA for UMTS: Radio Access for Third
Generation Mobile Communications. Wiley, 2002.
[12] http://www.eskimo.com/˜weidai/benchmarks.html.
[13] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson. Ariadne: A Secure On-Demand
Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of Mobicom,
2002.
[14] J.-P. Hubaux, T. Gross, J.-Y. Le Boudec, and M. Vetterli. Towards Self-
Organizing Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: the Terminodes Project. IEEE
Communications Magazine, 39(1):118 –124, January 2001.
[15] M. Jakobsson, J.-P. Hubaux, and L. Buttya´n. A Micro-Payment Scheme
Encouraging Collaboration in Multi-Hop Cellular Networks. In Pro-
ceedings of Financial Cryptography, 2003.
[16] D. B. Johnson and D. A. Maltz. Dynamic Source Routing in Ad Hoc
Wireless Networks. In Imielinski and Korth, editors, Mobile Computing.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
[17] B. Lamparter, K. Paul, and D. Westhoff. Charging Support for Ad
Hoc Stub Networks. Journal of Computer Communication, Special
Issue on Internet Pricing and Charging: Algorithms, Technology and
Applications, Elsevier Science, Summer 2003.
[18] Y.-D. Lin and Y.-C. Hsu. Multihop Cellular: A New Architecture for
Wireless Communications. In Proceedings of INFOCOM, 2000.
[19] O. C. Mantel, N. Scully, and A. Mawira. Radio Aspects of Hybrid
Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of VTC, 2001.
[20] S. Marti, T. Giuli, K. Lai, and M. Baker. Mitigating Routing Misbehavior
in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of Mobicom, 2000.
[21] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone. Handbook of
Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1997.
[22] P. Michiardi and R. Molva. Core: A Collaborative Reputation Mecha-
nism To Enforce Node Cooperation In Mobile AD HOC Networks. In
Proceedings of CMS, 2002.
[23] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V. Wen, D. Culler, and J. D. Tygar. SPINS:
Security Protocols for Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of Mobicom,
2001.
[24] V. W. Kipp. The battle of NIMBY.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi m0LEF/is 2002 August 1/ai 91033662.
[25] H. Wu, C. Qios, S. De, and O. Tonguz. Integrated Cellular and
Ad Hoc Relaying Systems: iCAR. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas
in Communications, 19(10), October 2001.
[26] J. Yoon, M. Liu, and B. Noble. Random Waypoint Considered Harmful.
In Proceedings of INFOCOM, 2003.
[27] A. N. Zadeh, B. Jabbari, R. Pickholtz, and B. Vojcic. Self-Organizing
Packet Radio Ad Hoc Networks with Overlay (SOPRANO). IEEE
Communications Magazine, June 2002.
[28] S. Zhong, Y. R. Yang, and J. Chen. Sprite: A Simple, Cheat-Proof,
Credit-Based System for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of
INFOCOM, 2003.
